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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (3).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
In addition to the issues raised by the Plaintiffs, the following issues require
appellate review:
A. Additional Issues.
1. What is the applicable standard of review of the district court's denial of
attorney's fees and costs? Plaintiffs contend that the standard is "correctness."
However, the Defendants contend that the applicable standard of review is "abuse of
discretion." See Barker v. Utah Public Service Comm., 970 P.2d 702, 707 (Utah 1998)
(internal citations omitted). If "abuse of discretion" is the correct standard, Plaintiffs
failed to marshal the evidence and their appeal is fatally defective. West Valley City v.
Majestic Investment Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1313 (Utah App 1991).
2. Is Plaintiffs' claim barred by the Utah Governmental Immunity Act (UGIA)?
This is an issue of law and is reviewed for correctness. State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 939
(Utah 1994).
3. Does the County Land Use Development and Management Act (CLUDMA),
Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-1001 et. seq., entitle a prevailing party to recover attorney's fees
and costs? This is an issue of law and is reviewed for correctness. State v. Pena, 869
P.2d 932, 939 (Utah 1994).
B. Preservation of Issues.
1

The County preserved these issues in the court below when it filed Salt Lake
County's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Fees and Costs, (R. at
3476-3501). The Plaintiffs' final operative pleading, Corrected Amended Complaint,
dated March 31, 1998, (R. at 2653-2657), did not seek attorney's fees and costs.
DETERMINATIVE LAW
The following statutes govern the claim for fees and costs:
1. Claims seeking awards of money against governmental entities are governed by
the the provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.1 Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1
etseq. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-2 provided:
As used in this chapter:
(1) "Claim" means any claim or cause of action for money or
damages against a governmental entity or against an employee...
(3) "Governmental entity" means the state and its political
subdivisions as defined in this chapter.
2. The Act specifically retained immunity for governmental activities involving
the exercise of a discretionary function and actions relating to the issuance or revocation
of licenses and permits. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-2 provided:
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury
proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee
committed within the scope of employment except if the injury arises out
of:

1

The cited provisions have remained substantially unchanged before and since the
Plaintiffs' litigation here.
2

(1) the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or
perform a discretionary function, whether or not the discretion is
abused...
(3) the issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of or by the
failure or refusal to issue, deny suspend, or revoke any permit,
license, certificate, approval, order, or similar authorization;

3. Plaintiffs' suit was based on the provisions of CLUDMA. Utah Code Ann. §
17-27-1002. Enforcement.

(l)(a) A county, county attorney, or any owner of real estate within the
county in which violations of this chapter or ordinances enacted under
the authority of this chapter occur or are about to occur may, in
addition to other remedies provided by law, institute:
(i) injunctions, mandamus, abatement, or other appropriate
actions; or
(ii) proceedings to prevent, enjoin, abate, or remove the unlawful
building, use, or act.
(2)(a) The county may enforce the ordinance by withholding building
permits.
(b) It is unlawful to erect, construct, reconstruct, alter or change
the use of any building or other structure within a county without
approval of a building permit.
(c) The county may not issue a building permit unless the plans
of and for the proposed erection, construction, reconstruction,
alteration, or use fully conform to all regulations then in effect.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In their Corrected Amended Complaint (R. at 2653-2657), Plaintiffs challenged the
County's land-use decisions and prayed that those decisions be set aside, that the building
pemiits and certificate of occupancy be declared null and void, and that they be awarded
reasonable access to their two residential properties. They prevailed on these claims, with

3

this court holding that their claims were viable under CLUDMA. Culbertson v. Bd. of
County Commissioners, 2001 UT 108,ffi[29-31, 44 P.3d 642. In Johnson v. Hermes
Associates, LTD, 2005 UT 82, 128 P.3d 1151, the Plaintiffs obtained injunctive relief
against the Hermes defendants (Hermes) requiring Hermes to restore the street in question
to its original status.
Although they never sought attorney fees and costs under their Corrected Amended
Complaint in Culbertson, well after judgment in this matter they filed a motion seeking all
of the attorney fees and costs they incurred in litigating against the County, the Hennes
defendants, and certain relatives. (R. at 3177-3446). The Plaintiffs raised a number of
alternative equitable theories for recovery. The trial court rejected the Plaintiffs'
alternative theories as not applicable and analyzed their claim under the private attorney
general doctrine.
The trial court, employing the test set forth in Stewart v. Utah Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 885
P.2d 759 (Utah 1994), found that the evidence they presented did not meet those
standards and denied their claim. The court found that Plaintiffs' litigation primarily
benefitted the Plaintiffs' private interests with little to no benefit running to the public.
(R.at 3588, pg. 22-24; R.at 3571-3572). The court held that this litigation did not benefit
the public as whole or vindicate a public policy over and above the Plaintiffs' pecuniary
interests. Id, The trial court pointed to the fact that in Johnson, 2005 UT at ^ 20-25,
this court specifically found special injuries suffered by the Plaintiffs, further
demonstrating the vindication of their personal rights rather than their championing of a
4

public interest. (R. 3588, pp. 3-4, 9, 22-24).
The Plaintiffs challenge the trial court's analysis claiming that it mis-applied the
Stewart test and that it erred in finding that no other attorney fee theory applied to this
case. They contend that the hearsay evidence of newspaper articles discussing this case
fulfilled their evidentiary burden of demonstrating the "public interest" in this case. In
short, they contend that "publicity" accorded an item by a news editor is the equivalent of
the "public interest." They seek judicial review, therefore, under the more liberal
standard of "correctness" (Appellant's Brief at p.5), rather than the more proper and
deferential "abuse of discretion" standard in reviewing the trial court's analysis of the
facts they failed to present to recover under any equitable denied their claim because it
theory.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
This litigation was first filed on July 21, 1995 via a verified complaint. (R. at 1-21).
That complaint requested the court to set aside any exemptions and invalidate any license
or permits relating to a commercial development of Hermes (Hermes), and establish
access to the Plaintiffs' properties. IcL This matter was dismissed on cross motions for
summary judgment on February 17, 1998. (R. at 2549-2563). Plaintiffs had also
maintained a parallel litigation directly against Hermes which was also eventually
dismissed.
This court consolidated these cases on appeal in Culbertson v. Bd. of County

5

Commissioners, 2001 UT 108, 44 P.3d 642, and reversed the trial courts. That decision
was issued on December 18, 2001. The case involving the County defendants remained
relatively inactive until March 10, 2006 when the Plaintiffs filed their motion seeking all
of the expenses they claim they incurred in litigating against the County defendants,
Hermes, and some relatives. (R at 3177). That motion was the first time the County
defendants received notice that the Plaintiffs sought monetary claims against them. The
motion claimed they were entitled to their litigation expenses under the equitable theories
of the private attorney general doctrine, the third-party litigation rule, and general
principles of equity.
After extensive briefing by the parties, the trial court heard oral argument on the motion
on May 12, 2006. (R at 3588, pp. 1-24). The trial court denied their motion. Id It
entered findings of facts and conclusions of law on June 5, 2006. (R. at 3569-3573).
Plaintiffs initiated this appeal.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Plaintiffs owned the only two properties on the south side of North Union Avenue and
Hermes owned the north side. Under their Corrected Amended Complaint, the Plaintiffs
succeeded in unbundling the approval of the Hermes project in Culbertson , 2001 UT 108.
This court held the Plaintiffs' action viable under Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-1002.
Culbertson Tflj 29-31.
Plaintiffs initiated this action against the Defendants without filing any notice of claim

6

or otherwise complying with the provisions of the UGIA. They went directly to the
district court and sought the rollback of the Hermes project. They did not seek attorney's
fees and costs until March 10, 2006 when they filed the motion under review. (R.at 31773446). Their failure to file a notice of claim for fees and costs under Utah Code Ann. §
63-30-13 deprives the courts of jurisdiction to entertain this new claim. Nielsen v.
Gurlev, 880 P.2d 130, 135 (Utah App. 1994).
Even if the Plaintiffs had complied with the notice provisions, their claim against the
Defendants is barred by UGIA which retained immunity for the Defendants' decisions
relating to the Hermes project because such a process involves a discretionary function
under Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(1), and the permit process under Utah Code Ann. §
63-30-10(3), for which the Legislature retained immunity.
The private attorney general doctrine is not applicable for a number of reasons. First, it
cannot be used to circumvent UGIA. Second, this theory of recovery is not assessable
against governmental entities absent specific statutory authorization or a waiver of
immunity. Finally, even if the court extends this doctrine to the Defendants, the Plaintiffs
still fail. They confused in the court below the concept that "publicity" is the equivalent
of the "public interest." A celebrity who travels to Africa to give birth has been accorded
greater publicity than the Plaintiffs and their case, yet her journey furthered no public
interest. The fact that a news editor elects to run several stories about an event does not
necessarily elevate that event to public interest status or transform in into an important

7

public policy. This suit was not about issues affecting the public at large; it was private
litigation over the only two properties on the south side of an obscure street and brought
to vindicate private interests. Other than those involved in the courts, generally no
average citizen could recite the Plaintiffs' names, identify their suit's issues, or point to
some benefit that inured to a citizen's property or relationship with County government.
In fact, the trial court recognized that in order to have obtained the injunction against
Hennes the Plaintiffs succeeded in showing damages peculiar to themselves. (R. 3588,
pgs. 3-4, 9, 22-24). More importantly, the Plaintiffs failed to present evidence of the
sufficient quality and quantity to convince the trial court in its fact-finding analysis that
their case met the Stewart standards for the award of their attorney fee claim. And, before
this court, they have failed to marshal that evidence to challenge the trial court's factual
analysis to secure appellate review and demonstrate the trial court abused its discretion in
not awarding them their attorney fees and costs.
The trial court correctly ruled that the third-party litigation rule was not applicable.
Plaintiffs' claims under this theory of recovery are barred by UGIA as discussed above,
and this theory is not applicable against governmental entities. The trial court also found
this theory inapplicable in the case at bar because the fees and costs claimed here could
not be viewed as damages flowing from tort or contract. Additionally, this theory may
only be used to recover litigation costs incurred with third parties such as against Hermes
not the costs incurred against the County and not those incurred litigating against

8

relatives. Again, the Plaintiffs failed to marshal the evidence to support a challenge to the
trial court's analysis.
Finally, this court, in Culbertson, at fflf 29-31, held that the Plaintiffs' action was
founded upon CLUDMA, which does not provide statutory authorization for an award of
attorney fees and costs. If the Legislature intended to provide for such a recovery it could
have done so as it has in numerous other statutes it has enacted. Its decision to omit such
a recovery for a party prevailing under CLUDMA precludes an end-run by some equitable
theory.
ARGUMENT
POINT I. UGIA BARS PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM BECAUSE THEY
FAILED TO FILE THE NOTICE OF CLAIM AND IMMUNITY IS
RETAINED FOR THE COUNTY'S PERMITTING PROCESS.
A. Applicable Standard
In the court below, the Defendants contended that the Plaintiffs' claim is subject to
UGIA. The trial court did not accept this argument. Since this issue is a question of law,
it is reviewed for correctness. State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 939 (Utah 1994).
B. Discussion
1. Plaintiffs' Failure to Provide Notice of Their Claim Deprives the Courts of
Jurisdiction.
At the time of the events underlying this case, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-13 required
anyone asserting a claim for money damages to file a notice of claim:
A claim against a political subdivision, or against its employee for an
9

act or omission occurring during the performance of his duties, within
the scope of employment, or under color of authority, is barred unless
notice of claim is filed with the governing body of the political
subdivision within one year after the claim arises, or before the
expiration of any extension of time granted under Section 63-30-11,
regardless of whether or not the function giving rise to the claim is
characterized as governmental.
See: Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11, detailing the contents of a proper notice of claim.
Plaintiffs filed no notice.
The filing of the notice is jurisdictional and their failure to file it is fatal:
The failure to comply with the notice requirements of the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act deprives the trial court of subject matter
jurisdiction, and therefore compliance with the act is a precondition to
maintaining an action "against the state, or against its employee for
an act or omission occurring during the performance of his duties,
within the scope of employment, or under color of authority." Utah
Code Ann. § 63-30-12(1993). See id. § 63-30-11: Lamarr v. Utah
State Pep't of Tramp.. 828 P.2d 535. 540-41 (Utah App.1992). In
Lamarr, we held that a suit against the State cannot be maintained
unless proper notice is given. 828 P.2d at 542. Moreover, we pointed
out that because improper notice divests the court of subject matter
jurisdiction, failure to provide proper notice of claim is a nonwaivable defense that any party, or the court, can raise at any time. Id.
at 540.

Nielsen v. Gurlev, 888 P.2d 130, 135 (Utah App.1994). Such notice must be filed before
maintaining an action. Id. at 136. Accord: Wheeler v. McPherson, 2002 UT 16,ffl[911, 40 P.3d 632. In the case before this court, because the Plaintiffs never filed the
requisite notice of their money claim for attorney fees and costs before filing their suit,
their claim is barred.

10

2. Defendants are Immune for Activities Relating to the Licensing/Permitting of the
Hermes Project.
This court employs a three-step analysis of governmental immunity claims. Lanev v.
Fairview City, 2002 UT 79,1 11, 57 P.3d 1007. First, the court determines if the activity
under review is a governmental function. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3(1) immunizes
governmental functions, which are broadly defined to include any "act" or "failure to act"
whether governmental, proprietary, and whether unique or essential or core to a
governmental function. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-2(4)(a). The Defendants' activities
relating to the permitting of the Hermes project are uniquely governmental actions as they
cannot be performed in the private sector. Second, the court determines if the Act has
waived blanket immunity under Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10 for injuries proximately
caused by the negligent act or omission of a governmental employee. The Plaintiffs
showed that the Defendants' permitting actions were erroneous. Finally, the court returns
to Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10 to determine if the Legislature retained immunity for the
claim at issue. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(3) retained immunity for any injury arising
out of "the issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of or by failure or refusal to issue,
deny, suspend, or revoke any permit, license, certificate, approval, order, or similar
authorization." The courts have consistently recognized this retained immunity.
In Metropolitan Fin. Co., v. State, 714 P.2d 293 (Utah 1986), the state issued two
certificates of title to a vehicle. Another party somehow obtained the first title, secured
from the state a fraudulent title showing him as the owner, and used that title as collateral
11

for a loan on which he defaulted. The lender sued the state because it had advanced the
loan on the strength of the fraudulent title. This court upheld immunity for the state:
... We need only observe that the statutory waiver of immunity
for negligence does not apply when plaintiffs alleged injury
arises out of the issuance of title certificates or the
misrepresentations or omissions of defendants' employees.
Immunity from suit... is waived for injury proximately
caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee ...
except if the injury:
(c) arises out of the issuance, denial, suspension or
revocation of... any permit, license, certificate, approval,
order, or similar authorization; or
(f) arises out of a misrepresentation by the employee
whether or not it is negligent or intentional;
S 63-30-10aXcUfl (emphasis added). Plaintiffs allegations
of negligence and conspiracy are clearly circumscribed within
these two statutory exceptions to any immunity waiver.
Therefore, even assuming that the facts alleged by plaintiff are
true, the Governmental Immunity Act does not waive immunity
from suit for the negligent or intentional performance by
defendants of these governmental functions. The summary
judgment against plaintiff is affirmed.
Id. at 293.
In DeBry v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428 (Utah 1999), the purchasers of an office building
sought damages against the county for the negligent inspection of the building and for the
"fraudulent issuance of the temporary occupancy permit for the building," because the
contractor had misrepresented information to the building inspector to secure the permit.
Id. at 430. The County would not finalize the occupancy and actually ordered the
12

purchasers to vacate the building. This court dismissed their claims because immunity
had been retained under two subsections of Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(3) (activities
relating to the issuance of permits and licenses or other authorizations) and (4) (activities
regarding inspections). DeBry at 441. This court relied on Gilman v. Dept. of Fin.
Institutions, 782 P.2d 506, 512-513 (Utah 1989), which had held there was no liability for
the "negligent or wrongful issuance or revocation of licenses and permits."
In Butler. Crockett and Walsh Develop. Corp., v. Salt Lake County, 205 WL 2303808
(UT App 2005) (unpublished) (copy attached), the plaintiffs sued over the denial of a
conditional use permit. The court found the County's action a protected activity under the
UGIA relating to the issuance of permits and licenses.
Courts have also recognized that immunity extends to licensing and permitting
decisions under the immunity retained for discretionary functions under Utah Code Ann.
§ 63-30-10(4). See: Wilcox v. Salt Lake City Corp.. 484 P.2d 1200, 1202 (Utah 1971)
(waitresses' suit for denial/renewal of work permits based upon wrongful reviews of
waitresses' chest x-rays barred by discretionary function immunity); Seal v. Mapleton
City. 598 P.2d 1346, 1348 (Utah 1979) (governmental function immunity protected city's
failure to approve subdivision plan); and D.C.A. Develop. Corp., v. Ogden City Mun.
Corp., 965 F.2d 827 (10th Cir.1992) (discretionary function exception under state law
immunized city's refusal to issue occupancy permit before expiration of favorable tax
treatment program for development).
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In Loveland v. Orem City Corp.. 746 P.2d 763 (Utah 1987), this court held that the
actions of the city council and planning commission in analyzing land-use decisions are
uniquely governmental in nature and retained immunity. The court found that the
commission's receipt, analysis, and approval of the plat, the council's review and
approval of the plat, and the commission's failure to require the project to fence the canal
within the subdivision and in which the plaintiffs child fell and drowned were
immunized under "the governmental function " exception to the Act's waiver of
immunity. Id. at 775-776. And in Bennett v. Bow Valley Develop. Corp.. 797 P.2d 1419
(Utah 1990), this court, relying on Loveland, supra, held that the city's activities relating
to its inspection and acceptance of a subdivision project and releasing the bond were
protected by governmental immunity, even though the homeowners claimed that the city
wrongfully released the developer's bond and that the city commission had colluded with
the developer by withholding information of the unstable ground conditions that caused
the homeowners' damages. Id. at 422-423 .
In the case at bar, the Defendants' actions surrounding the Hermes project may
be characterized as erroneous or wrongful and have been undone by the courts as
requested by the Plaintiffs. However, their claim for money to reimburse them for their
litigation costs is barred because they did not file the requisite notice of claim. It is barred
by the retention of immunity for discretionary activities and the decisions relating to the
permitting of the Hermes project. Plaintiffs cannot turn their claim for setting aside those

14

actions into money damages by seeking their costs of litigation. They cannot indirectly
secure a monetary award through equity which they could not have directly accomplished
under UGIA.
POINT II. THE PRIVATE ATTORNEY GENERAL THEORY IS NOT
APPLICABLE.
A. Applicable Standard
Plaintiffs contend that the trial court improperly applied the private attorney
general doctrine and they seek review of the correctness of that ruling. However, the trial
court's decision whether to award fees under the private attorney general doctrine is
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Shipman v. Evans. 2004 UT 44, ^}25, 100 P.3d 1151.
B. Discussion
The trial court analyzed the Plaintiffs claim under the private attorney general
doctrine recognized by this court in Stewart v. Public Serv. Common,, 888 P.2d 759 (Utah
1994). Stewart, relying on Serrano v. Priest, 141 Cal. Rpt. 315, 569 P.2d 1303 (CA
1977), held that the ratepayers' attorney fees could be recovered under a common fund or
private attorney general theory, because their suit set aside the Public Service
Commission's rate of return, established the unconstitutionality of a state statute, created
a multi-million dollar refund for the benefit of all ratepayers in the state, and vindicated
an important public policy that benefitted all ratepayers in the state. Stewart, supra at
783-784. On remand, the commission made its attorney fee award out of that common
fund, which this court affirmed. Barker, supra. 970 P.2d 702, 708.
15

The trial court, exercising its discretion, Shipman. 2004 UT at |25, reviewed the
record and the evidence presented by the Plaintiffs and concluded that they had not met
their burden to recover under this doctrine. The Defendants urge this court to sustain the
trial court's ruling under several independent grounds. First, the trial court rejected
recovery under this theory not by misapplying the test, but because Plaintiffs' evidence
was insufficient; that is, they did not meet their burden of proof. Second, the private
attorney general doctrine should not be employed to circumvent UGIA, especially as that
doctrine for recovering litigation costs has not enjoyed wide acceptance by courts and
invades the province of the Legislature.
1. The trial court correctly applied the Stewart test and did not abuse its discretion
in rejecting Plaintiffs' claim.

Plaintiffs assert in their brief that the private attorney general doctrine has
developed in Utah into a three-part test- whether a strong or societally important public
policy is vindicated, the plaintiffs costs transcend the plaintiffs pecuniary interest, and
the case is extraordinary. (Appellants' brief at 18). They use this assertion to contend
that the trial court applied the wrong legal standard in analyzing their claim. Contrary to
that assertion, in Shipman atfflf23-25, this court expounded on the private attorney
general doctrine:
Among the methods of granting an equitable award of attorney
fees is a doctrine known as the "private attorney general." Under
this doctrine, "[c]ourts... have awarded attorney fees to a party as a
'private attorney general' when the 'vindication of a strong or
16

societally important public policy' takes place and the necessary
costs in doing so 'transcend the individual plaintiffs pecuniary
interest to an extent requiring subsidization.'" Stewart, 885 P.2d at 783
(quoting Serrano v. Priest. 20 Cal.3d 25. 141 Cal. Rptr. 315. 569 P.2d
1303. 1314 (1977fl.
Awards of attorney fees under the private attorney general doctrine
are dispensed sparingly. In Stewart, we awarded attorney fees under
the doctrine but "note[d] the exceptional nature of [that] case. We
further note[d] that any future award of attorney fees under this
doctrine [would] take an equally extraordinary case." Id. at 783 n.19.
In that case, we applied an extremely high standard - that "but for"
plaintiffs' action, the ill could not have been cured.
In this case, the trial court determined that plaintiffs were not
entitled to an equitable award of fees under the private attorney general
theory, concluding that plaintiffs' lawsuit did not vindicate a societally
important public policy and that the remedy sought was achieved
via initiative, not court order. Because we review this holding under
an abuse of discretion standard, we will not undertake our own
assessment of whether plaintiffs vindicated a public policy, nor will we
attempt to gauge anew the importance of any vindicated policy, nor will
we tackle the question of whether plaintiffs' actions were comparable
to those we found "extraordinary" in Stewart. Instead, we review the
trial court's determination that an equitable reward was not merited
here only to see if the trail court abused its discretion. We hold that it did not.
(Emphasis supplied). Even if this holding is construed into a three-part test, the Plaintiffs
did not meet their burden in the trial court to recover under this theory.
In the case at bar, the trial court employed the Stewart test: "Stewart says, 'Courts
have awarded attorney's fees to a party as a Private Attorney General when vindication of
a strong or society (sic) important public policy takes place and the necessary costs of
doing so, transcends the individual's pecuniary interest to an extent requiring subsidation
(sic)...'" (R.3588, p. 23). The trial court also explained that had the Plaintiffs obtained an
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injunction that changed government's review of developments and the requirements
relating to setbacks and roadways, the doctrine might apply, but it specifically found that:
"...the specific relief they (Plaintiffs) got in this case really only benefits them as owners
of the property. That's where I'm drawing the line." (Id at p. 9). The trial court
specifically found that "the plaintiffs in the underlying litigation sought and obtained
relief for their 'special injury,' not for vindication of a broad public interest." (R. at 3571,
finding 7). The trial court made its findings and rulings after stating: "I have read all the
memos that have been submitted with respect to this motion. I've read most of the
cases." (Id. at p. 1). The court considered the facts and theories advanced by the
Plaintiffs in their motion and supporting memorandum, and found that they did not meet
the Stewart standards. On appeal, Plaintiffs urge this court to do what it would not do in
Shipman: perform its own assessment of whether Plaintiffs vindicated a public policy, reevaluate the importance of any vindicated public policy, and independently assess
whether this case is "extraordinary." Id. ^ 25.
In their brief before this court, Plaintiffs attempt to expand the private attorney
general doctrine to include additional elements: "...to encourage potential private litigants
to assert rights embodying important public interests that, due to the costs of litigation,
might otherwise go unenforced..." and to provide "...an incentive to encourage parties to
enter into certain litigation affecting public interests," and they assert that the court
"must inquire into the party's pre-litigation motivations." (Appellants' Brief at 19-20)
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(emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
There are four basic flaws with the Plaintiffs' contentions. First, their reliance on
the federal cases cited is unhelpful, as the attorney fee awards were predicated upon 42
U.S.C. § 1988 of the Civil Rights Act wherein Congress specifically elected to authorize
the courts to make fee awards. As even the Plaintiffs acknowledge, the United States
Supreme Court refused to adopt the private attorney general doctrine as a part of federal
common law. Aleyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y. 421 U.S. 240, 247,
270 n.46 (1975). Second, the California cases cited by Plaintiffs suffer the same
deficiencies as that state's legislature elected to codify the doctrine in its Code of Civil
Procedure § 1021.5, effective January 1, 1978, which restricts those courts' discretion
whether to make an award under the doctrine. Third, the Utah courts have not expanded
the doctrine to encompass other policy grounds such as a "catalyst" theory or to
"encourage litigation." In fact, Utah has restricted the theory:
However, in Stewart we recognized an exception to the traditional rule and held
that an equitable award of attorney fees was proper under the private attorney
general doctrine, which allows for an award of fees where a plaintiff successfully
vindicates an important public policy benefitting a larger population. See Stewart.
885P.2dat783.
Faust v. KAI Technologies. Inc.. 2000 UT 82, If 18, 15 P.3d 1266. Fourth, Plaintiffs did
not raise these alternative grounds in the court below, precluding judicial review. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Clyde. 920 P.2d 1183, 1185 (Utah 1996).
They must also convince this court that by vindicating their own rights, an event
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which occurs in each and every lawsuit where one party prevails no matter how protracted
or contentious the litigation, that society in general has benefitted. They assert that their
interests are equal to those of the citizenry at large in order to meet the theory's test for
recovery. By its nature, this theory is not applicable to the facts of this case.
In fact, our courts have drawn the private attorney general theory of recovery so
narrowly that it excludes the plaintiffs' recovery here:
"'However, in the absence of a statutory or contractual authorization,
a court has inherent equitable power to award reasonable attorney fees
when it deems it appropriate in the interest of justice and equity.'" Id.
(quoting Stewart v. Public Serv. Comm fn. 886 P.2d 759. 782 (Utah
1994)).
Among the methods of granting an equitable award of attorney
fees [recognized in Utah] is a doctrine known as the "private
attorney general." Under this doctrine, "[c]ourts ... have awarded
attorney fees to a party as a 'private attorney general' when the
'vindication of a strong or societally important public policy' takes
place and the necessary costs in doing so 'transcend the individual
plaintiffs pecuniary interest to an extent requiring subsidization.'"
Shipman v. Evans. 2004 UT 44. ^ 23, 100 P.2d 1151 (alterations in
original) (citations omitted). However, fees awarded under this
doctrine are not only unusual, but they are awarded only in
extraordinary cases. See id. at U 24.

Utahns for Better Dental Health-Davis, Inc. v. Davis County Comm'n, 2005 UT App. 347,
f 6, 121 P.3d 39. The trial court employed this test and found that the Plaintiffs' suit did
not vindicate an important public policy and their costs did not transcend their own
interests. In fact, the court specifically found that the case primarily benefitted themselves
(90%) and not primarily the public (10%). R. at 3588, p. 23; 3569, pp. 3-4).
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In the case at bar, the Plaintiffs' suit did not create a public fund against which to
assess fees and costs. Their suit vindicated their rights, but no one else's. It did not benefit
a "larger population." They did not show that their victory transcended their individual
pecuniary interest requiring subsidization. They did not serve as the sole representatives of
a vindicated public interest. Their contention that by setting aside the Defendants' land use
decisions in this case they have benefitted the public at large because their suit forced
public officials to account for actions outside the law is not sufficient to award them their
litigation expenses. See Van Emmerik v. Montana Dakota Util. Co.. 332 N.W.2d 279, 284
(South Dakota 1983) (rejecting "extra-statutory award" of attorney fees "for redress of a
public wrong"). The fact that several local papers reported on the case did not supply the
trial court with that quality of evidence demonstrating this case arose to a public policy or
public interest. Plaintiffs' failure to marshal the trial court's factual findings and to
demonstrate their inadequacy to support its conclusions precludes judicial review. West
Valley Citv.supra. 818 P.2d at 1313.
2. The Private Attorney General Doctrine Enjoys Limited Judicial Acceptance
Further Supporting the Trial Court's Findings And Conclusions Denying any
Award.
Stewart relied on Serrano v. Priest 141 Cal. Rpt. 315, 569 P.2d 1303 (CA 1977),
for the private attorney general theory of attorney fee recovery, a doctrine that has
generally been rejected by other courts. See State Board of Tax Comm 'n v. Town St. John.
751 N.E.2 657, 658 (Ind. 2001) (refusing to recognize private attorney general exception in
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tax payer's challenge to state's property tax scheme); New Mexico Right to ChooseNARAL v. Johnson, 982 P.2d 450, 458 (N.M. 1999) (refusing to adopt private attorney
general doctrine for successful challenge of abortion restrictions); Pearson v. Bd. of Health
of Chicopee. 525 N.E.2 400, 402 (Mass. 1988) (surveying other states' approaches to the
theory and refusing to award fees to taxpayers prevailing under open meeting law), and
Aleyeska. supra at 421 US 270 n.46 (refusing to adopt attorney fee award by judicial
decree).2
More importantly, this court has recently held:
<J 24 We have previously recognized that "[t]he term 'public
policy' is inherently not subject to precise definition." Berube
v. Fashion Centre, Ltd,. 771 P.2d 1033. 1042 (Utah 1989) (quoting
Petermann v. Int'lBhd. Of Teamsters. 174 Cal. App. 2d 184. 188,
344P.2d25(1659)): see also Peterson v. Browning. 832 P.2d 1280.
1282 (Utah 1992). Although public policy eludes attempts at precise
definition, it may be understood as a matter of such fundamental
concern to society that the right of individuals to order their affairs
by contract may yield to society's interest in preserving or
advancing the matter. Constitutions and statutes are often the source
of public policy. Id_ Sometimes, statutes contain purposeful legislative
expressions of public policy. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann § 53A-12-102
(2002) ("It is public policy of this state that public education shall be
2

Although Defendants have not attempted to list all states' decisions, the following
cases show in the inapplicability of the private attorney general doctrine: Shelby County
Comm'n. v. Smith. 372 So.2d 1092, 1097 (Alabama 1979) (no award even though
plaintiffs' suit brought wide-spread salary adjustment); Hamer v. Kirk. 64 111.2d 434, 356
N.E.2d 524, 526-527 (no fee award absence creation of common fund in tax payer class
action); Okla. Tax Comm'n. v. Rick. 888 P.2d 1336, 1339-1340 (Okla. 1994) (fees
awarded only if common fund created in direct supervision and control of court); Jones v.
Muir. 511 Pa. 535, 515 A.2d 855, 860 (1986) (doctrine only available through legislative
authorization); and Providence Journal Co. v. Mason. 116 R.I. 614, 359 A.2d 682 (1976)
(rejecting fee award in employment discrimination claim).
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free."). It is important to note, however, that "[t]his does not mean that
all statements made in a statute are expressions of public policy."
Browning. 832 P.2d at 1282. Just as not every statutory enactment
rises to the level of public policy, conduct that falls short of strict
compliance with a statute may not always constitute the type of public
policy transgression sufficient to warrant intervention in a private
contractual relationships.
Lee v. Thorpe. 2006 UT 66, f 24, 147 P.3d 443.
Plaintiffs request this court to second guess the trial judge's findings that this suit
failed to implicate sufficient public policies warranting a fee award. The trial court's
caution was well founded, for under the Plaintiffs' theory, attorney fees recovery would be
implicated in every suit involving government. That is why the majority of courts that have
examined the theory have rejected it outright or have limited its application to those cases
where a common fund was created which inured to the benefit of the citizenry at large and
the suit did not vindicate the litigants' financial rights. Retention of the doctrine under the
common fund theory makes sense where the underlying suit created a fund benefitting the
public at large while vindicating an important public policy, rather than simply according
the trial court such broad discretion to circumvent the American rule that each party bears
its own litigation costs in the absence of statute or contract. This approach harmonizes this
court's pronouncements in Stewart and Faust, and extends a zone of comfort to the trial
courts and society that a fund was created from which to make an award.
In the case at bar, plaintiffs have vindicated their own interests and no more. The
trial court's findings, which Plaintiffs have not challenged, that 90% of the benefits of this
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litigation inured to the Plaintiffs and only 10% benefitted the public, were actually too
liberal a finding in favor of a public benefit. The Plaintiffs have not pointed to any
specific, definable public benefit generated by this litigation outside of broad general
statements which did not meet their evidentiary burden before the court. No other
neighbors received a benefit from the Plaintiffs' actions here. Accepting their theory
creates a dangerous and unworkable premise that any time a citizen prevails against a
governmental entity, litigation costs should be awarded, whether the challenged decisions
relate to animal licenses, the thickness of sheet rock in new projects, side-yard and set-back
provisions. That approach cannot be the standard for circumventing UGIA. Here,
plaintiffs' actions did not confer a substantial benefit to any ascertainable class of County
citizens. Their suit created no fund at all, let alone a fund benefitting others. The relief
they sought and gained from the court only benefitted themselves. Under the private
attorney general theory as a basic concept, and even under the Utah cases, their claim and
their evidentiary support do not justify an award of attorney fees and costs against the
Defendants.
POINT III. PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM THAT ATTORNEY FEES BE
AWARDED UNDER GENERAL EQUITY PRINCIPLES IS BARRED
BECAUSE THEY FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE UPON
WHICH THE COURT RELIED IN EXERCISING ITS DISCRETION,
AND THE OTHER THEORIES OF RECOVERY ARE INAPPLICABLE.
A. Applicable Standard.
The trial court's ruling is reviewed under an abuse fo discretion. Shipman,
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2004 U n 25.
B. Discussion.
Plaintiffs complain that the trial court should have awarded them their litigation
expenses under general principles of equity, particularly relying on Jensen v. Bowcut 892
P.2d 1053 (Utah App. 1995). Plaintiffs have not marshaled the trial court's findings
supporting its decision and demonstrated that the court abused its discretion.
Moreover, Bowcut is not helpful here. As the court recognized in upholding an
award of fees:
...Similar to the examples set forth above, Jensen expended her time and
resources for the benefit of another-in this case, for the support of a minor. We
believe that under these circumstances equity demands the award of attorney fees.
Moreover, the award of fees in this case was, in reality, simply a part of the child
support award itself since the fees went to reimburse Jensen for her "support" of
David.

Id. at 1058-1059. In the case at bar, Plaintiffs' suit is not based on their financing of
another person whose support should have been provided by the defendant.
Their reliance on Cafferty v. Hughes. 2002 UT App 105, 46 P.3d 233 , cert, granted
56 P.3d 603 (2002), is misplaced. In that case the court of appeals upheld the fee award
because the beneficiary's suit against the trustee obtained a recovery for all of the
beneficiaries of the trust. 2002 UT App at f 23-24. This court reviewed the attorney fee
award and concluded that the trail court properly awarded fees because: "Indeed, the
litigation resulted in the recapture of substantial funds to the trust estate, which benefitted
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all beneficiaries." Hughes v. Cafferty. 2004 UT 22, If 30, 89 P.3d 148. The court
recognized that even if a prevailing party falls within one of the categories for equitable
recovery of attorney fees, it is not necessarily entitled to an award, icL at f 22, fn. 1,
because the trial court has "considerable latitude and discretion" in supplying and
formulating an equitable remedy, id. at ^ 20 (internal citations and quotations omitted), and
it need "not adhere to a rigid analysis." Id at ^[ 31.
In the case at bar, the trial court, in its discretion, analyzed the alternative theories
and concluded they were not applicable, as the Plaintiffs were not seeking contractual or
tort damages, see Macris & Associates v. Neways, Inc.. 2002 UT App 406,fflf13-14, 60
P.3d 1176, and they had not pled for a fee award . (R.3588 at pp. 4-5). And, Plaintiffs pled
themselves out from recovering under the third-party litigation theory when they sought
fees for their suits against these Defendants, Hermes, and their relatives, Macris , 2002 at ^
K 19-2031, when that theory may only allow recovery of fees incurred in litigating against
third parties.
POINT IV. PLAINTIFFS5 CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY CLUDMA.
A. Applicable Standard
The issue is reviewed for correctness. State v. Pena, Supra 869. P.2d at 939.
B. Discussion.
Plaintiffs' claims are also barred by the procedures and relief provided by the Utah
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County Land Use Development and Management Act [CLUDMA] 3 . The Plaintiffs
challenged the County's enforcement of its land-use decisions, and this court held that they
prevailed under Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-1002. Culberston. 2001 UT 1 0 8 , ^ 2 9 - 3 1 .

Thus

>

the Plaintiffs' suit against these Defendants must be viewed within the framework of Utah
Code Ann. § 17-27-1002, which allows injunction, abatement, mandamus, and other
remedies for reversing the erroneous land-use decision, but specifically omits awards of the
costs of litigation.
Where it has so desired, the Legislature has provided for the award of attorney fees:
Utah Code Ann. § 7-15-l(7)(b)(v) (2002) (bad checks); § 30-1-17 and 18 (1988)
(mechanics' liens); § 76-6-412(2)( 1997) (treble damages and fees for theft); § 58-1 la503(5) (2001) (penalties against barbers and cosmetologists); § 78-36-10(3)(1994)
(forcible entry and detainer); and § 63-30d-903(l) (2004) (government employee's
recovery of attorney fees and costs for failed prosecution), a non-exhaustive list.
If the Legislature had intended to give such an aggrieved party the right to recover
attorney fees and costs when successfully challenging a land-use decision, it would have
expressly so provided. It is a fundamental tenet of statutory construction that"... the
expression of one [thing] should be interpreted as the exclusion of another." Sorenson's
Ranch School v. Oram, 2001 UT App 354, f 11, 36 P.3d 528 (quoting Biddle v.

3

CLUDMA (see U.C.A. Iffi 17-27-101, et. seq) was superceded by the enactment of the
Local Land Use Amendments [LLUDMA] by the 2005 Utah Legislature (SB60). The version of
provision of CLUDMA quoted herein was in effect during the time period relevant to this case,
and had last been amended in 1991.
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Washington Terrace City. 1999 UT 110,1(14, 993 P.2d 875). In the case of CLUDMA, the
Legislature provided for various forms of equitable relief, but conspicuously did not
provide for recovery of attorney fees.
It is clear that at the time the purported "cause of action" arose against the County,
the legislature had not seen fit to provide a right for an aggrieved citizen to recover attorney
fees in challenging a county land-use decision. Nor had the Salt Lake County Commission
provided by ordinance under the authority of CLUDMA an express right for a disgruntled
citizen to recover attorney fees in an administrative challenge, even though the County
could have expressly so provided if it so elected.
These specific expressions of legislative intent trump the plaintiffs5 vague assertions
of "equity" and "vindication of public policy" under their theories of recovery. Even the
state's organic sources for the land-use decision making process and challenges to that
process undercut the Plaintiffs' claims for reimbursement.
CONCLUSION
The Plaintiffs' claim for fees and costs is fatally flawed. There is no statutory basis
for such an award and the Legislature specifically omitted the recovery of litigation
expenses for successful challenges of land-use decisions. Without legislative authority, a
court may not assess fees and costs against a governmental entity. The Plaintiffs never
sought fees and costs as part of their suit but sought to overturn the County's land-use
decisions.
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Their money "claim" falls within the ambit of the Utah Governmental Immunity
Act. They failed to comply with its provisions- they never filed a notice of claim, depriving
the courts of jurisdiction. Moreover, the Legislature retained immunity for a governmental
entity's actions relating to the discretionary function of land-use activities and for the
activities surrounding any permit process.
Their private attorney general theory in untenable. They cannot show that their
win vindicated any rights but their own. Their suit created no windfall to the advantage of
other citizens, as the trial court found that 90% of the benefits of this litigation inured to the
Plaintiffs. They have not marshaled the evidence supporting the trial court's factual
findings and demonstrated that their inadequacy in supporting the trial court's decisions,
thereby precluding appellate review.

The restoration of the road does not even benefit any

other citizens.
Their third-party litigation claim is defective because it is not applicable against
governmental entities. Moreover, they have failed to marshal the trial court's findings
rejecting this theory of recovery and they have not shown that the trial court abused his
discretion. This theory of recovery may not be used as Plaintiffs have attempted here to
recover their litigation expenses from litigating against third parties but even from these
Defendants and from litigating against their relatives. Therefore, their motion should be
denied in its entirety.
DATED this J a n u a r y , 2007.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ALAYNA J. CULBERTSON
and
DIANE PEARL MEIBOS,
Plaintiffs,

;
]>
])
;

vs.

]

THE BOARD OF COUNTY
COMMISSIONERS OF SALT LAKE
COUNTY, J.D. JOHNSON, in
his capacity as Director of
Development Services for Salt Lake
County; THE CITY OF MID VALE, a
body politic; and MARK McGRATH, in
his official capacity as Planning
Director for Midvale City,

]
]
;
)
)>
]
])
]
]

Defendants.

CORRECTED AMENDED
COMPLAINT

Civil No. 950905166AA
Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson

)

Plaintiffs, for their cause of action against defendants, allege as follows:

1.

That they are fee owners of homes and real property located in unincorporated

Salt Lake County with the addresses of 1072 East North Union Avenue and 1078 East North
Union Avenue.
2.

That North Union Avenue is the sole access and easement to these properties and

has been so since the parcels were platted in approximately 1857. A copy of the 1857 plat is
attached as Exhibit "A". Plaintiffs' property consists of Lots 3-6 and 19-22, marked with an
"X".
3.

That all or part of the public right-of-way located to the south of parcels 3-6 has

been vacated or abandoned by Salt Lake County.
4.

That on or about April 12, 1994, the Salt Lake County Planning Commission

approved a site plan for Hermes Associates to build a shopping center around plaintiffs property
(Exhibit "B").
5.

That defendant Board of County Commissioners of Salt Lake County is the

governing body of Salt Lake County.
6.

That defendant J.D. Johnson is the current Director of Development Services for

Salt Lake County and the officer responsible for enforcing the requirements of the uniform
Zoning Ordinance of Salt Lake County.
7.

That effective January 1, 1998, defendant City of Midvale annexed a portion of

unincorporated Salt Lake County that includes plaintiffs' property and the shopping center
surrounding it.
[meibos^dmend-com 2ac]

- 2 -

8.

That defendant Mark McGrath is the current planning director for the City of

Midvale and is responsible for ensuring that property situated within the jurisdiction of the City
of Midvale complies with applicable planning and zoning statutes, and regulations.
9.

That on July 28, 1994, Development Services issued a Conditional Use Permit

to Hermes Associates for the construction of this shopping center. (Exhibit "C").
10.

That on August 10, 1994, the Salt Lake County Commission signed an ordinance

vacating North Union Avenue between 1000 East and 1300 East, except for the portion to the
north of plaintiffs' property. This ordinance also created a 25-foot public right-of-way to the
west of plaintiffs' property. This street is now known as 1070 East. (Exhibit "D").
11.

That 1070 East and North Union Avenue in front of plaintiff's property do not

meet the minimum standards established by Salt Lake County's Roadway Standards and the
Uniform Zoning Ordinance.

That this road does not provide plaintiffs with adequate and

reasonable access to their property.
12.

That the building shown on the site plan as Retail 3 has not been built in

compliance with the minimum standards required by the Uniform Zoning Ordinance and with
the express terms of its Conditional Use Permit. That this same building has been built on top
of the public right-or-way established for 1070 East.
13.

That the building shown on the site plan as Retail 2 has not been built in

compliance with the minimum standards required by the Uniform Zoning Ordinance and with
the express terms of its Conditional Use Permit.
[meibos\amend-com 2ac]
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v*

That on June 21. 1995, the Salt Lake County Commission voted to grant Hermes

tt.1. xmi

;h,

Kidw ay standards for 1070 East and North Union Avenue as they

access plaintiffs' property. (Exhibits "E" arid "F").
V rf IER EFOR E, I Plaintiffs pray f :)i: ji I igmei it as f : >1.1 c: • ;\ s :
r h a t the exemptions granted to H e r m e s Associates

be declared

arbitrary,

capricious una n , . . . .
I h a t any and all building permits, certificates of occupancy or other licenses and
permits issued to, for or regarding the buildings shown as Retail 2 and Retail 3 be declared null

That the Court grant plaintiffs a hearing for a determination as to what constitutes
iLa.M

,

te access to plaintiffs' proper 1:>

vd\ \ Judgment be issued requiring the Count) to provide plaintiffs with access
to their property which meets the requirements established

DATED this

3

'

A\J

L^:

HCILI.:.

day of March, 1998.
PARR

WADDOUPS, BROWN, GEE & LOVELESS

Attorney! tor Plaintiffs

[meibos\amend- c: o t n, 2 a c J
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the _

• •< ui Mdi\.ii, 1998 a true and correct copy of

the foregoing CORRECTED AMENDED COMPLAINT was served via hand-delivery to the
parties set forth below:
Patrick F. Holden, Esq.
Deputy County Attorney
SALT LAKE COUNTY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
2001 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200
Jay D. Gurmankin, Esq.
BERMAN, GAUFIN, TOMSIC &
50 South Main Street, Suite 1250
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Dale F. Gardiner
O'RORKE & GARDINER.
6965 Union Park Ctr. #450
Midvale, Utah 84047
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EXHIBII 2

FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

DAVID E. YOCOM [USB #3581]
DISTRICT ATTORNEY FOR SALT LAKE COI \ ; "

DONALD H. HANSEN [USB #1332]
T.J. TSAKALOS [USB # 3289]
Deputy District Attorneys
By.
2001 South State Street, #S3700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200
Telephone: (801) 468-3421
Facsimile: (801) 468-2622
Attorneys for Defendants/Third-Party Plaintiffs
Board of County Commissioners of Salt Lake County and Ken Jones
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SALT LAKE COUNTY.

Deputy Clerk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ORDER DENYING
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR AWARD
OF ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS

ALAYNA J. CULBERTSON and
DIANE PEARL MEIBOS
Plaintiffs,
vs.
THE BOARD OF COUNTY
COMMISSIONERS OF SALT LAKE
COUNTY and KEN JONES, as Director o:
Development Services for Salt Lake Countv

Civil No. 950905166AA
Judge ANTHONY B. QUINN

Defendants/Third-Party Plaintiffs.
vs.
FORT UNION ASSOCIATES, L.C., a Utah
Limited Liability Company, and
HERMES ASSOCIATES, LTD., a Utah
Limited Partnership
Third Party-Defendants

PAGh 1(0

i

The above-entitled civil action came on regularly for oral argument on May 12, 2006 at
10:a it. i I. : n tl le foil : ni lg i i I : ti : i is: (1) I 'laintiffs' Motion foi \ ttomey Fees,, Costs arid I itigati :)i i
Expenses (filed March 10, 2006), and (2) defendant Salt Lake County's Motion to Strike Portion of
Plaintiffs' Statement of Facts (filed March _ ;, JUU ;. Appearing and arguing on behaii * ; i;ie
plaintiffs were their attorneys Jeffrey Hunt and David Reymann of Parr Waddoups Brown Gee &
Loveless.

Appearing and arguing on behalf of the defendants were TJ. Tsakalos and Donald H.

oral argument, the court had reviewed all the memoranda submitted by the parties' counsel, the cases
cited therein, and selected portions of the exhibits attached thereto.
Based upon the arguments, memoranda and authorities presented by the parties and their
counsel, and finding good cause therefor, the court hereby finds and ORDERS as follows:
1. '

1

' ^vv ;' vs. osts and I itigati :)ii

" * itl: II espect to Plaintiffs'ftlotion ••

Expenses, there is no applicable statute or contractual provision which expressly
permits the award of fees to the plaintiffs herein.
2.

With respect to the plaintiffs' claim for attorney fees under the "third-party lit w . m
rule," the court finds that the rule recognizes that attorney fees may be a measure of
danKuvv

:

>• • •

vr'>cv; !~v^ * c

found within the court's inherent equitable authority.
3.

rmiiK-i

UA o v i !;;K!

V ••-.:, was no "common :ui;d ^ -ate*/. ?,\ piamtills'

action in this case from which attorney fees can or should be paid.
4.

Further, with respect to the plaintiffs' claim for attorney fees under the "third-party
"

;

• -

i

v

• • .

'

'.:M-"
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i.

' •

•.••

- ^

- r \ |

a m a L I

.

J S

o

r

fees asserted by plaintiffs in their complaint herein as amended to date.
5.

With respect to the plaintiffs' claim for attorney fees under the "private attorney
general doctrine," in order to grant an award of attorney fees and costs under that
doctrine, the court must first determine whether the plaintiffs' legal action, and the
specific relief secured as a result of the plaintiffs' action, primarily benefitted the
plaintiffs individually or, rather, primarily benefitted the public at large.

6.

Further, with respect to the plaintiffs' claim for attorney fees under the "private
attorney general doctrine," that doctrine is not intended to extend the exception to the
American rule - which rule restricts awards of attorney fees in civil ligation to cases
where such an award is expressly authorized by contract or statute - to any case in
which a citizen's legal action effectively restrains an unreasonable exercise of
governmental power, even though such a legal action may incidentally result in a
general, indirect benefit to the public at large.

7.

Further, with respect to the plaintiffs' claim for attorney fees under the "private
attorney general doctrine," the plaintiffs in the underlying litigation sought and
obtained relief for their "special private injury," not for vindication of a broad public
interest.

8.

Further, with respect to the plaintiffs' claim for attorney fees under the "private
attorney general doctrine," in analyzing whether the individual plaintiffs, as opposed
to the general public, primarily benefitted from the prosecution of this action by the
plaintiffs, the Court finds here that plaintiffs as individuals primarily benefitted from
the relief they secured, and not the general public. Specifically, the court concludes

- PAGE 3 OF 5 -

that approximately ninety percent (90%) of the benefit of the relief obtained inured
to the plaintiffs as individuals, while approximately ten percent (10%) of the benefit
may have inured to the general public. Thus, plaintiffs have failed to meet their
burden under the private attorney general doctrine of showing that the public at large
primarily benefitted from the plaintiffs' prosecution of this action.
9.

Defendant Salt Lake County's Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiffs' Statement of
Facts is denied.

THEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing, the Court ORDERS as follows:
1.

Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorneys Fees, Costs and Litigation Expenses is
DENIED.

2.

Defendant Salt Lake County's Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiffs'
Statement of Facts is DENIED.

DATED this

C

day of

/ ^ ^ ^ ^

2006.

BY THE COURT:

l O M ^ Q U I N N ., /
District ( # t o j u ^
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that the foregoing ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS and DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE
was duly served upon the following by U.S. First Class Mail, postage prepaid:
Ronald G. Russell, Esq.
Jeffrey J. Hunt, Esq.
David C. Reymann, Esq.
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS

185 South State Street, Suite 1300
Salt Lake City UT 84111
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Mark 0. Moms, Esq.
David P. Williams, Esq.
SNELL & WlLMER

15 West South Temple Street, Suite 1200
Salt Lake City UT 84101
Attorneys for Third-Party Defendants

on this

iS^day of

, 200^_.

UJ±M
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1

SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH - MAY 12, 2006

2

JUDGE ANTHONY B. QUINN PRESIDING

3
4

P R O C E E D I N G S
THE COURT:

Let'S go on the record in the matter of

5

Culbertson vs. Board of County Commissioners of Salt Lake.

6

Please state your appearances.

7

MR. HUNT:

Good morning Your Honor, Jeff Hunt and

8

David Reymann for the plaintiffs.

9

MR. TSAKALOS:

10
11

T. J. Tsakalos for the County, Your

Honor and with me is Don Hansen.
THE COURT:

All right.

We're here today on the

12

plaintiff s Motion to Awarded Attorney's fees and costs

13

associated really with both this action and the action that was

14

consolidated against Hermes, at least for purposes of appeal.

15

I have read all the memos that have been submitted with respect

16

to this motion.

17

selectively from the exhibits.

18

tentative views are and then give you a chance to respond.

19

I've read most of the cases.

I've read

I'm going to tell you what my

I guess I start with two propositions that in my mind

20

set forth the dilemma that I face as a judge in this case.

21

First is a sense of almost outrage at the County's conduct in

22

this case which the Supreme Court of Utah had characterized as

23

a willful, deliberate violation of the law.

24

placed on notice for years that their conduct was in violation

25

of the law, their insistence on going forward with providing

Despite being

1

1

exceptions to the law for the purposes of allowing this

2

development to go forward is really, really troubling.

3

The second proposition is that I take a conservative

4

view of my power as a district court judge and struggle to find

5

an exception to the general rule that unless provided for by

6

contract or statute, that I don't have the authority to grant

7

attorney's fees to prevailing party in civil litigation.

8
9

The first theory that's advanced that would allow me
to grant attorney's fees in this case is the Private Attorney

10

General Exception and I really don't find that particularly

11

applicable to the facts in this case because I believe that the

12

specific results obtained in this case primarily benefitted the

13

plaintiffs and not the public as a whole.

14

proposition that whenever the power of government is restrained

15

by the acts of its citizens and brought in conformance with the

16

law, that every member of the public benefits to some degree

17

but I don't believe that the Private Attorney General Exception

18

is intended to extend to all those situations where the power

19

of government is restrained by civil litigation filed on behalf

20

of particular plaintiffs.

21

situations, then the dog license analogy advanced by the County

22

would be an apt analogy because if, contrary to law, a dog

23

licese were granted or denied, that would be as arbitrary a use

24

of government power as that which we are seeing in this case

25

and there's a public interest in that not happening and it

I accept the general

If it included all of those

1

relates to the safety of the public because a dog license

2

insures that rabies vaccinations occur and other things and so

3

to some extent, every member of the public would benefit by the

4

restraint of government power in that case.

5

be a way to draw a line so that not every case where the law is

6

vindicated in an action against a governmental agency,

7

attorney's fees are awarded and I think that the line that has

8

been drawn by the Supreme Court in the Stewart case with

9

respect to the Private Attorney General Exception is you look

But there has to

10

to the specific relief obtained and you determine whether that

11

specific relief benefitted the public as a whole or whether the

12

benefit was primarily for the benefit of those individual

13

plaintiffs.

14

Interestingly, plaintiffs in this case succeeded in

15

getting an injunction in the Hermes action and took the

16

position in that case that they suffered a special private

17

injury.

18

someplace. This is on page 4, at least of the Lexus, it looks

19

like it's Page 14 of the Pacific Report.

20

states in that case, "We have defined special damages in the

21

context of zoning violation of damage over and above the public

22

injury which may be caused by the violation of the zoning

23

ordinance.

24

substantially more than those of the general community.

If you look at the Johnson case which I've got here

The Supreme Court

The damages need only different kind or be
As the

25 I only landowner surrounded on three sides by Hermes expansion

1

Appellees have obviously suffered a different and more

2

substantial impact than any other landowners near the Family

3

Center.

4

Appellees are the only homeowners whose residential property is

5

within feet of the shopping center and who have been affected

6

in kind by Hermes' substandard roadway construction and non-

7

compliance."

8

the Supreme Court makes a finding of specific and discreet

9

injury to these plaintiffs as opposed to the public at large as

The record unequivocally reflects the fact that

Well, it goes on but at the plaintiff's urging,

10

a condition to approving injunctive relief in this case which,

11

it's not a mirror image of the issue that I'm facing but it's

12

close because I would have to find in order to grant attorney's

13

fees that the specific relief - this is my view of the law,

14

that the specific relief obtained in this case benefitted the

15

public as a whole virtually to the same extent as they did the

16

plaintiffs in this case and for that reason I don't think that

17

Private Attorney General Exception applies.

18

Secondly, with respect to the third party litigation

19

section, that is not a reflection of the Court's equitable

20

power to grant attorney's fees to a prevailing party in limited

21

circumstances.

22

been recognized in limited circumstances whereas one of the

23

items of damage that a plaintiff may obtain, he can obtain the

That is simply a measure of damage that has

24 I costs of pursuing litigation against a third party if it's
25

proximately caused by the negligent act of another or if it's,

1

in the contract section, it's a consequential damage of the

2

breach of contract or another.

3

one, fits into that but even more importantly, having checked

4

the complaint in this case, the corrected amended complaint

5

which I believe is the most recent complaint filed, no claim

6

for damages at all.

7

claim and I can't award damages where none were prayed in the

8

complaint.

9
10

I don't think this case, number

So I can't simply award - this is a damage

So anyway, that's my tentative assessment.
Mr. Hunt, I'll give you a chance to demonstrate the

error of my analysis.

11

MR. HUNT:

Thank you, Your Honor.

I want to thank

12

you for your comments.

13

neglected to introduce my client, Pearl Mybois, who is in court

14

today as well and seated to her right is her father, Blaine

15

Johnson as well and I wanted to introduce them to the Court.

16

THE COURT:

17

MR. HUNT:

It will help focus my argument.

Thank you.

I

It's nice to have them here.

Your Honor, also I may make reference to

18

two demonstrative exhibits which are m

19

admitted in this case and I'd like to turn those around if I

20

may.

21

THE COURT:

22

MR. HUNT:

the record, have been

Of course.
I've shown these to counsel prior to Your

23

Honor coming on the bench.

Just to introduce the exhibits,

24

this is the plat that was attached to the Conditional Use

25

Permit that the County issued to Hermes to construct the

1 I shopping center addition.

So what this does is depicts the

2

roadways and the Croxford property in relation to the shopping

3

center development.

4

shaded in yellow, 1070 E. Street which the Supreme Court found

5

was a public street is right here abutting the west and North

6

Union Avenue which the Supreme Court found is a public street

7

abuts to the north of the property.

8

and the property to give Your Honor a visual depiction and then

9

this, of course, is a photograph taken by Pearl Mybois at

The Croxford property is identified there,

So these are the roadways

10

approximately 1999 after the construction had occurred in a

11

photograph, before the construction had occurred and you can

12

see here what the problem was here building the shopping center

13

directly on the roadway with no setbacks, sidewalks, which the

14

Supreme Court found was illegal.

15

I'd like to focus on the Private Attorney General

16

Doctrine and that specific requirement that Your Honor has

17

honed in on which I agree is at the heart of our motion and

18

which I'd like an opportunity to try to change Your Honor's

19

mind on.

20

and Hermes which the Court in a very unusual opinion strongly

21

condemned in the Hermes and Culbertson opinions and I would

22

submit to Your Honor that even taking a conservative view of

23

Your Honor's powers, it's clear under the Stewart case that you

24

do have inherent equitable power to make an award of attorney's

25

fees and costs when you deem appropriate in the interests of

This was outrageous conduct engaged in by the County

1

justice and equity.

2

in the Stewart case and they went on in that case to say, one

3

of the ways you can do that is the Private Attorney General

4

Doctrine where in essence the plaintiff, the litigant has to

5

take on the role of the attorney general to obtain enforcement

6

of the laws and that's exactly the case that we have here, Your

7

Honor.

8
9

Those are the words of the Supreme Court

My clients did everything within their power to get
Salt Lake County to enforce the law in this case.

This was not

10

a case like a dog license or a challenge of a refusal to issue

11

a dog license or even a challenge, as the County makes argument

12

in their brief, of the issuance of the CUP, the Conditional Use

13

Permit.

14

don't issue the CUP.

15

development.

16

is not the analogy to this case.

17

of all, if you're going to build the shopping center addition,

18

you can't do it with tax subsidies and they took that case to

19

the Utah Supreme Court and won.

20

there was a ruling that tax subsidies could not be used for the

21

shopping center expansion.

22

development, bought out all of the homeowners adjacent to the

23

development with the exception of one, my clients.

24

descendants of the Croxford and Griffiths family who have been

25

living on this property for 100 years refused to sell.

We never challenged that.

We never said, County,

We never said, County, don't approve the

We never said, don't issue the dog license.

That

What my client said is first

They invalidated the RDA and

After that they went ahead with the

The

So what

1

did they do?

2

commercial buildings, 200,000 square feet of commercial

3

buildings, in excess of 25 feet just literally casting a shadow

4

over the property because they built it right on the road.

5
6

The enveloped the property on three sides with

Before they did that, before the County allowed them
to do that, my clients said, County, we understand that they

7 I can build their shopping center addition but they need to obey
8

the laws.

They need to obey the zoning and roadway ordinances

9

that are in effect.

I think that's what distinguishes this

10

case.

This is a case where we have, and this is what makes it

11

a more general application.

12

impacted by development in this state including this county

13

should have the right to rely on the government authority that

14

has enforcement power to protect their rights, to protect their

15

rights with respect to that development, to make sure that it

16

complies with the existing public safety laws which are

17

intended to benefit not just the property owners that live

18

right next to it, but everybody, everybody that is in the

19

jurisdiction of those ordinances and laws has the benefit of

20

them and that's all my clients did.

21

allow them to build their buildings on the roadway without the

22

setbacks, without the sidewalks, without the legally required

23

width, without the legally required turning radius.

24

illegal.

25

said no, after they tore out the road, they went in and tried

Stop them.

All property owners that are

They said, County, do not

And the County said no.

That's

They not only

1

to fix it with their after-the-fact exceptions to the roadway

2

ordinance which the Supreme Court condemned.

3

And my argument to Your Honor is simply that there is

4

a broader public policy at issue here in allowing residents to

5

rely on the government authority that has enforcement

6

responsibility to do their job and in this case, they didn't do

7

their job and why didn't they do their job?

8

we submit is because they sought contractual indemnification

9

from the party that they were suppose to enforce those

10

One of the reasons

ordinances against and —

11

THE COURT:

Mr. Hunt, let me focus you on what I

12

think is missing in this case because like I said before, I

13

think whenever citizens take action to check unreasonable use

14

of government power, we all benefit.

15

specific relief that they had obtained in this case - and I'm

16

not saying that it would have been a relief that's available or

17

that would have been a good injunction, but if they had gotten

18

an injunction saying that the County may never again approve a

19

development without appropriate setbacks and roadways that

20

comply with law, that's a good argument for application of

21

Private Attorney General Exception but the specific relief they

22

got in this case really only benefits them as owners of the

23

property.

24
25

If they had, as the

That's where I'm trying to draw the line.
MR. HUNT:

Sure, and I'd like to suggest that the

impact was broader than that and here's why.

After we get

1

these roads reconfigured after Hermes complies with the Court's

2

injunction, we're going to have roadways that are of legal

3

width with the legal turning radius here and a legal turnaround

4

here with setbacks and side blocks and if you look at the

5

benefit, every member of the public - these are public roads.

6

They tried to argue they were private roads but they're not.

7

The Supreme Court said these are public roads.

8

the public that drives along these roadways, every emergency

9

personnel that uses those roadways, sanitation, snowplow

Every member of

10

drivers, ambulances will be able to have access that is on

11

legally required roads with legal turnarounds and legal widths,

12

legal setbacks.

13

public to walk on sidewalks than it is on the middle of the

14

road.

15

It's obviously much safer for members of the

Now, you may say well, but it's a dead-end street,

16

the only people that go down there would be people that have an

17

interest in going to this property.

18

We've got commercial buildings here that have access for the

19

loading docks and a trash compacting facility.

20

vehicles that use that.

21

public at large in making sure that those vehicles travel on

22

roadways that are safe and in fact, Your Honor, this inures to

23

the benefit of every single family that is going to live on

24

this property in the future.

That's not quite true.

So we have

There's a safety interest in the

Right now it's my client's,

25 | that's true, that as the Court said, they were the ones that
10

1

were disproportionally impacted by the violation but there are

2

going to be other families living on that property.

3

it's Elama Culbertson.

4

moved there in 1981 to care for her 80-year old grandparents

5

who were living on the homestead.

6

other families there and people that travel along that roadway,

7

those

8

the public.

9

public has the right to travel and I think that the safety

Right now

She's lived there for 25 years.

She

But there are going to be

public streets are all going to benefit, every member of
These are public roads that every member of the

10

illustration, the safety issue with those streets was

11

illustrated just last month when there was an individual who

12

called for 911 on the property and because of the

13

configuration, illegal reconfiguration of these roads, couldn't

14

find the property, got there too late and the individual died.

15

It was covered in the newspapers last month.

16

dramatic illustration of the unsafe condition of these roadways

17

and because of the relief that my client sought, not just sort

18

of the general policy, I mean, there's different levels of

19

generality, you're right, that you can look at this.

20

look at it in terms of enforcing the laws generally when an

21

entity has been put on notice they're violating them, whether

22

that indicate an important social policy, but also at a more

23

micro level, the specific relief here is going to benefit all

That's just a

You can

24 I members of the public, all future people who live on that
25

property and you can't, you know, who knows where these road
11

are going to go eventually?

But when they are extended if they

ever are, they're going to be the legally required widths and
turning radius, etc., that comply with the ordinances.
And I think to address Your Honor's point about the
special damage and the Supreme Court opinion in Culbertson, I
thought about that and I think it's important to draw the
distinction between what the Court was talking about there and
what we're talking about here.

The Court was talking about the

special damages that my clients were required to prove to have
standing.

It was a standing analysis, in order to get the

injunctive relief that we were requesting and what the Court
said was, we want to appropriately narrow the class of people
that are entitled to that type of relief and if you're out
somewhere else in the county, you shouldn't be able to come in
say Hermes ought to tear their illegally constructed buildings
down.

You need to have some kind of special injury to yourself

over and above the general public and we obviously do.

We're

not denying that, that we're impacted in a way that is more
severe than the general public, but I don't think that is
necessarily the same thing as saying that the public is not
deriving a benefit by the relief that we obtained in this case.
I don't think that's the same thing.

If that were the case,

then every time a party was entitled to injunctive relief,
mandatory injunctive relief to require buildings to be torn
down, to remedy a violation of the zoning ordinance, you'd
12

1

never be entitled to attorney's fees under the Private Attorney

2

General Doctrine and I think that's a harsh, inequitable

3

result.

4

intended in Stewart and I don't think that they, frankly were

5

thinking about this particular case in Stewart but it is an

6

extraordinary case and they did say it takes the extraordinary

7

case and the Shipman case later, they say it takes the

8

extraordinary case.

9

but in a different way.

I don't think that was the result that the Court

And my argument that it is extraordinary
You're right, it didn't create a fund

10

that's going to benefit a large group of people.

It didn't

11

create a law or a rule of the court that says that all

12

government entities need to comply with their zoning laws but I

13

think that they didn't say that because it's self-evident.

14

mean, the government entities are charged with enforcing the

15

law and in this case they were put on notice that they weren't

16

doing that and they went ahead anyway.

17

anyway.

18

the place where we should have been in 1995 and I think that

19

that process of saying that not just the developers but as Mr.

20

Horouchi called them in his opinion column in the Tribune that

21

small groups of people, he called us a small group of people

22

that were sacrificed for the good of the taxpayers.

23

groups of people are entitled to the benefit of the law too,

24

not just developers that indemnify the County against risks

I

They went forward

For 10 years we had to fight them to finally get to

Small

25 I like this lawsuit which by the way County has filed as Your
13

1

Honor probably know, a third party complaint against Hermes

2

under that indemnification provision saying if the Court awards

3

any fees, those fees should be paid by Hermes, pursuant to that

4

contractual indemnification and I think there is a public

5

policy in vindicating that aspect of the case, that a County

6

simply can't abdicate its enforcement authority to a private

7

developer and say, you know, if it all shakes out bad, you guys

8

are on the hook.

9

vindicated in this case and would be with an award of fees that

10

the County needs to take responsibility for its illegal actions

11

and this isn't a discretionary call by the County that we're

12

challenging.

13

court determined it was arbitrary and capricious and overturned

14

it.

15

your shopping center but, you know, you can't squeeze these

16

people like you did.

17

violation of the existing laws and that's what we think is the

18

public policy that we've vindicated.

19

it's inequitable to say that just because it's a dead end

20

street that we don't qualify for the Private Attorney General

21

Doctrine in the award of fees in this case.

22

that's one way you could look at it if the street went through,

23

more cars would be going along it.

24

the relevant fact, at least that's what we would suggest to

25

Your Honor.

There ought to be a policy which I think was

It's not like they made a zoning decision and the

That's not this case.

This case is, yeah, you can build

You can't envelope them like you did in

It can't be - we think

I mean, I guess

I don't think that that's

It's the fact that it's a public road, it's a
14

1

public right-of-way/ public sidewalks and every member of the

2

public once those are constructed will have the benefit of

3

safer streets and safer sidewalks and safer access for the

4

emergency personnel and that public safety is recognized in

5

Salt Lake County's own ordinance which is the ordinance that we

6

vindicated in this case, the safety from fire and other

7

dangers, adequate light and air, protection of the urban

8

environment.

9

So I understand Your Honor's concern.

It is the

10

concern with the application in this case but I think if you

11

look at it both on the broader policy level and then the

12

specific results that we obtained here, not just for our

13

clients but for every member of the public, we qualify under

14

the Private Attorney General Doctrine for recovery of fees and

15

this isn't a far fetched notion.

16

other cases in California that have applied the doctrine in

17

this context and the —

18

THE COURT:

We cited the Court to the

They have a specific statute in

19

California that's broad enough to cover land use decisions

20

which we are lacking here in Utah.

21

MR. HUNT:

I would just argue by analogy that the

22

Court in Stewart did rely heavily on the Cerono decision in

23

California for recognition of the doctrine and the other

24

California cases we cited did apply it in the context of zoning

25

violations and ordinance violations.
15

1

So, you know, I don't think it's the dog license

2

case.

This is a truly extraordinary situation where you had

3

the entity that was responsible for" protecting the public

4

including my clients, refusing to enforce the law after being

5

put on notice and then trying to fix it with their after-the-

6

fact exceptions.

7

that condemns that kind of conduct that says, you know, that

8

kind of conduct won't be tolerated.

9

too and everybody that lives next to shopping centers or

There's an interest in vindicating a result

These people have rights

10

commercial developments have rights that need to be protected.

11

We think we've indicated that interest in this case and we've

12

indicated the more practical public safety, health and safety

13

interest of driving on safe roadways.

14

And just finally, Your Honor, just to touch on sort

15

of the balancing points here, weighing my client's personal

16

gain here versus the cost that they incurred in prosecuting

17

this litigation.

18

The only thing that they ever wanted was compliance with the

19

law.

20

have been with legally required setbacks with some landscaping,

21

sidewalk, the turning radius that should have been in the cul-

22

de-sac.

23

Hermes litigation which we were - they were a necessary part.

24

We had to sue Hermes to get this relief and that's why we think

They're not getting any pecuniary benefit.

They wanted a road that was legally as wide as it should

And now we're going to get that as a result of the

25 [ we're entitled for the Hermes fees as well under the equitable
16

1

theory.

2

financially.

3

This isn't a result that's benefitting my clients
It's just merely getting compliance with the law.

And, Your Honor, finally, I would just submit that

4

the Court does have legal authority to award this remedy if you

5

determine that it's proper under the analysis, the Private

6

Attorney General Doctrine analysis and in thinking about that,

7

it really is an equitable remedy and if you think about who

8

should bear the financial consequences of the County's illegal

9

conduct in this case, should it be the homeowners who did

10

everything that they could for 10 years to get the County to

11

stop and to get the County to enforce the law or should it be

12

the County who should have undertaken that duty in the first

13

place?

14

that justice and equity argue for an award in this case.

15

you.

16
17

We'd just simply submit if you weigh those choices,

THE COURT:

Thank you, Mr. Hunt.

Thank

I'll hear from the

County.

18

MR. TSAKALOS:

Thank you, Your Honor.

I'll try to be

19

brief.

The plaintiffs have prevailed in this case and I don't

20

have a problem with that.

21

put this in prospective.

22

litigation and maybe they're so personally involved they don't

23

see things.

24

about two, two and a half months ago when they filed their

25

motion for fees and the first thing I did was start scratching

I congratulate them but I need to
Counsel has been involved in

The first time I became involved on this case was

17

my head and the next thing I did is I read the cases and I know
your concern about what transpired here but I think we need to
look at what the Supreme Court said in particular.

We are not

Hermes even though the way the plaintiffs have approached this
motion before you is to put us all in the same basket.
Supreme Court didn't go there.

The

What the Supreme Court said was

that the district court judge who found our actions proper made
a mistake.

He was erroneous.

It also said on Culbertson One

that the plaintiffs contest the court's interpretation.

It

held in Culbertson 1 at paragraph 42, "We conclude the Judge's,
and Ken Jones' decisions were erroneous."
again regarding the 1070 East Street.

They used the term

The roadway standards

that were applied, the plaintiffs contend that the exception
was erroneous.

That's at paragraph 48.

The Court, "We

conclude the exceptions were erroneously granted."
to the County.

This is as

The court did say, "Hermes acted willfully and

deliberately" at paragraph 56 but in its conclusion and the
record, the record says, we made a mistake that's been
rectified.
Even in the Johnson vs. Hermes which is the
Culbertson Two case, the Court again says the County's decision
was erroneous.

We made a mistake.

So I think the Court can

take some comfort in what the Supreme Court actually found in
this matter in terms of our activities and in terms of issuing
and approving this project.

Now, on the Private Attorney General theory, I think
counsel has a problem when I look at their reply brief at page
7 to 9, I raised the defense that this was a discretionary
action, that we were entitled to immunity and at page 7 to 9
they take the argument, it wasn't discretionary because this is
not affecting basic governmental policymaking just as the Court
focused in its opening statements.

I know they're trying to

stretch this Private Attorney General theory and I just don't
see how it can get there because as I pointed out, I know my
dog analogy was simple but it would apply to a setback if we
decide a 20 foot setback is required, the landowner says 18 is
sufficient and the Court finds 19, we've got a fee driven
lawsuit going on.

It can be anything as simple as what kind of

plywood is put into a project.

We say 3/4 inch, the developer

says half inch, we have a lawsuit and attorney's fees are going
to drive these kinds of cases just like they do in the civil
rights arena.

This was not brought as a civil rights case.

It's brought backwards from a 2001 decision until today asking
for a very large sum of money involving the - I'd like to point
out to the Court, not only the action against the County, the
action against Hermes, but the action against a relative that
was involved here.

I think it was the Croxfords.

I don't know

the case as well as the Court or these folks but I saw three
cases and three fees that they're asking for here.
I want to touch a little bit on this Private Attorney
19

General theory.

The Supreme Court in Stewart relied on the

Sorano decision and as the Court pointed out, that California
cases have been codified on the Private Attorney General
theory.

The cases I cited to the court show it's basically a

disfavored approach.

Very few if any of the courts have

accepted at Private Attorney General theory in general let
along against a governmental entity.

Even on remand of the

public service - back to the Public Service Commission in the
Private Attorney General theory under Barker vs. Public Service
Commission, the court did not go off on the Private Attorney
General theory.

It went off on the common fund that the action

of the few rate payers created a multi-million dollar —
THE COURT:

But they said that even if it wasn't

enough, even if the common fund wasn't enough that they were
entitled to recover attorney's fees under the Private Attorney
General theory.
MR. TSAKALOS:

But they made the award there and

there's no Utah case that goes the opposite direction that
actually has awarded under the Private Attorney General theory.
As a matter of fact, both the parties in this case have cited
the Utahns for Better Dental Health out of Davis County on the
fluoride cases.

Judge Dawson denied them attorney's fees that

they sought under this Private AG theory.

It was remanded and

in February he issued his other opinion on the remand, again
denying the Private Attorney General theory and in that
20

1 I particular case, we have health issues involved for literally
2

thousands and thousands of residents in Davis County and the

3

judge found that that did not transcend the personal interests

4

of these particular plaintiffs who brought the action.

5

was not sufficient to give them an award of fees and in here,

6

no matter how you want to argue it, there are two folks that

7

benefitted from this decision and that's what they sought and

8

that's what they got.

9

than that.

10

THE COURT:

11

MR. HUNT:

That

I don't think I can belabor it any more

Anything else, Mr. Hunt?
Just briefly, Your Honor on the argument

12

that we're not Hermes, the record is clear that they acted hand

13

in hand with Hermes throughout this entire process.

14

the contractual indemnification from Hermes, they acceded to

15

all of Hermes demands and this is what we ended up with.

16

court in Culbertson One did condemn the County.

17

THE COURT:

18

MR. HUNT:

They got

The

That's certainly the way I read it.
Not just Hermes and I don't need to read

19

the language but it's in paragraph 56 and they said that the

20

County should be condemned for violating its own ordinances in

21

this case.

22

Your Honor, we would just submit that justice and

23

equity do argue in favor of an award in this case under the

24

Private Attorney General Doctrine for all the reasons we've

25

said.

We don't think that this benefits just Elaina Culbertson
21

and Pearl Mybois.

We think it vindicated the important side

interest in being able to go to the enforcer of the laws and
require that enforcer to enforce them.

We had to undertake

that duty ourselves in this case after we put them on notice.
That's what makes this case extraordinary.
a mistake.
claiming.

This was not simply

This is not simply, we didn't know what you were
They knew since 1995 and they did it anyway.

That's

why the Court condemned their conduct and that's the important
societal interest that we claim is being vindicated, was
vindicated in this case in addition to the fact that these are
public roads and every member of the public from now into the
future that travels on them will be traveling on roads that are
safer because of the result in this case.
Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT:

Thank you.

If there were a doctrine

either found in a statute or in an opinion that gave me
authority to award attorney's fees if the County willfully
violated its own ordinances, I would not hesitate to do that in
this case; however, I remain unconvinced that this is a good
case for application of the Private Attorney General's
Exception to the general rule in Utah which is that I don't
award attorney's fees to prevailing parties.

And once again,

the approach that I've taken is to look at the specific results
obtained in the litigation and determine who benefitted
primarily.

Did the public primarily benefit or did these
22

1

private litigants primarily benefit?

Stewart says, "Courts

2

have awarded attorney's fees to a party as a Private Attorney

3

General when vindication of a strong or society important

4

public policy takes place and the necessary costs of doing so,

5

transcends the individual's pecuniary interest to an extent

6

requiring subsidation.

7

interest in the sense of award of money damages but there was

8

an individual interest pursued in this case in terms of

9

improving access to a specific parcel of property and what I

10

think that language requires me to do is look at the results

11

and weigh and determine, you know, who ultimately benefitted

12

from the specific results in this case?

13

individual plaintiffs or was it the society as a whole?

14

was even, then I think that - if it was at least even the

15

Private Attorney General Exception would apply but if you have

16

a situation where the interests vindicated on behalf of the

17

individuals, whether pecuniary or not, but the specific results

18

obtained, whether it benefitted them as compared to society as

19

a whole, I think it's probably 90/10 in favor of the individual

20

litigants in this case and because of that, I don't think that

21

it's fair to say that they were out there representing the

22

public as a whole and should be reimbursed their attorney's

23

fees.

24

Hunt, even though this is a compelling case to do something to

25

help out these individuals.

Now there was no individual pecuniary

Was it these
If it

I just view the exception more narrowly than you do, Mr.

I don't see it within my power so
23

I'm going to deny the Motion for Attorney's fees.

I ask the

County to prepare the order if you would please.
MR. TSAKALOS:

There's also a Motion to Strike.

Do

you want to make any order...
THE COURT:

In light of my decision, I don't think

it's worth spending a lot of time on that.

For purposes of

your order I've denied the Motion to Strike because I think
it's all things that I can consider in this kind of an
equitable evaluation.
(Whereupon the hearing was concluded)
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claims in December 2004 based on failure to prosecute.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK COURT RULES
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Court of Appeals of Utah.
BUTLER, CROCKETT AND WALSH
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Plaintiff and
Appellant,
v.
SALT LAKE COUNTY, Defendant and Appellee.
No. 20050057-CA.
Sept. 22, 2005.
Third District, Salt Lake Department, 000904688. The
Honorable Robert K. Hilder.
John Walsh, Salt Lake City, for Appellant.
David E. Yocom and Donald H. Hansen, Salt Lake
City, for Appellee.
Before Judges BILLINGS, MCHUGH, and ORME.
MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official
Publication)
PER CURIAM.
*1 Butler, Crockett and Walsh Development
Corporation (Butler) appeals the trial court's dismissal
of its complaint.
Butler filed its complaint against Salt Lake County (the
County) in 2000, after the County denied Butler's
application for a conditional use permit (CUP). The
complaint alleged six causes of action, seeking
monetary damages and the granting of the CUP. The
trial court dismissed the first three causes of action in
January 2003, determining that the claims were barred
by governmental immunity under the Governmental
Immunity Act. See Utah Code Ann. §g 63-30-1 to -38
(1997V [FN 11 The trial court dismissed the remaining

FN1. This chapter was repealed effective July
1, 2004, and a new governmental immunity
act was enacted. See Utah Code Ann. §§
63-30d-101 to -904 (2004). The former Act
controls this case.
Butler asserts the trial court committed reversible error
in its January 2003 order when it dismissed claims for
failure to file a notice of claim and failure to file an
undertaking. See id. § 63-30-12 (providing for notice of
claim); § 63-30-19 (requiring an undertaking to be filed
at the time a complaint is filed). However, the trial
court did not dismiss the claims on those grounds. In its
order, the trial court noted that Butler had complied
with the notice requirements and that Butler had filed
an undertaking, although untimely. The trial court then
dismissed the claims based solely on governmental
immunity. In sum, Butler's asserted error does not
directly address the trial court's decision.
Butler does not show that the trial court erred in
concluding that governmental immunity applied. In
determining whether immunity applies, Utah courts
have "looked to whether the injury asserted 'arose out
of conduct or a situation specifically described in one
of the subparts of 63-30-10; if it did, then immunity is
preserved." Ledfors v. Emery County Sch. Dist, 849
P.2d 1162,1166 (Utah 1993V Courts will reject claims
that reflect "attempts to evade these statutory categories
by recharacterizing the supposed cause of the injury."
Id. The theory of liability crafted by a plaintiff does not
control. See id.
Although couched as a contract-based declaratory
action, the substance of the complaint seeks affirmative
relief, not just the declaration of rights under a contract.
The breach cause of action demands that the trial court
grant the CUP and damages. It does not request the trial
court to enforce the contract through specific
performance or declare the standard to which Butler is
entitled under the contract. The additional causes of
action in the complaint, although supposedly based on
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the same contract, go further afield fiom contiact lehef
One seeks a review and reversal of the County's
decision, the otheis assert violations of due piocess and
civil rights rather than conti act-based actions The
complaint as a whole demonstrates that the undeilying
harm was the denial of the CUP
Because the injury asserted aiose out of conduct or a
situation specifically described in one of the subparts of
Utah Code section 63-30-10, governmental immunity
is preserved See Utah Code Ann § 63-30-10 Section
63-30-10(3) expressly retains immunity foi any injury
that "arises out of, in connection with, or results from
the issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation or by the
failure or refusal to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke any
permit, license, certificate, approval, order, or similar
authorization " Id § 63-30-10(3) The demal of a CUP
comes withm the scope of this section, retaining
immunity for claims arising from the denial of a
permit See id As a result, the trial court properly
dismissed the causes of action based on governmental
immunity
*2 The remaining causes of action were dismissed in
December 2004 for failure to prosecute Butler does not
challenge that dismissal, but attempts to reach back to
challenge prior rulings However, because the prior
rulings did not provide the grounds for the actual final
dismissal, Butler's aiguments are not on point Butler
has not shown that the trial court erred m dismissing the
remaining claims for failure to prosecute
Accordingly, the dismissal of Butler's complaint is
affirmed
END OF DOCUMENT
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FILED DISTRICT COURT

DAVID E. YOCOM [USB #3581]

Third Judicial District

DISTRICT ATTORNEY FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY

DONALD H. HANSEN [USB #1332]
T.J. TSAKALOS [USB # 3289]
Deputy District Attorneys
By2001 South State Street, #S3700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200
Telephone: (801) 468-3421
Facsimile: (801) 468-2622
Attorneys for Defendants/Third-Party
Plaintiffs
Board of County Commissioners of Salt Lake County and Ken Jones
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m

SALT LAKE COUNTY

Deputy cierK

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ALAYNA J. CULBERTSON and
DIANE PEARL MEIBOS

ORDER DENYING
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR AWARD
OF ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS

and

Plaintiffs,

DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE

vs.
THE BOARD OF COUNTY
COMMISSIONERS OF SALT LAKE
COUNTY and KEN JONES, as Director of
Development Services for Salt Lake County,
Defendants/Third-Party Plaintiffs.
vs.
FORT UNION ASSOCIATES, L.C., a Utah
Limited Liability Company, and
HERMES ASSOCIATES, LTD., a Utah
Limited Partnership
Third Party-Defendants
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Civil No. 950905166AA
Judge ANTHONY B. QUINN

The above-entitled civil action came on regularly for oral argument on May 12, 2006 at
10:a.m. on the following motions: (1) Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney Fees, Costs and Litigation
Expenses (filed March 10,2006), and (2) defendant Salt Lake County's Motion to Strike Portion of
Plaintiffs' Statement of Facts (filed March 24, 2006). Appearing and arguing on behalf of the
plaintiffs were their attorneys Jeffrey Hunt and David Reymann of Parr Waddoups Brown Gee &
Loveless.

Appearing and arguing on behalf of the defendants were T.J. Tsakalos and Donald H.

Hansen, Deputy District Attorneys of the Salt Lake County District Attorney's Office. Prior to the
oral argument, the court had reviewed all the memoranda submitted by the parties' counsel, the cases
cited therein, and selected portions of the exhibits attached thereto.
Based upon the arguments, memoranda and authorities presented by the parties and their
counsel, and finding good cause therefor, the court hereby finds and ORDERS as follows:
1.

With respect to Plaintiffs' Motion for Award of Attorney Fees, Costs and Litigation
Expenses, there is no applicable statute or contractual provision which expressly
permits the award of fees to the plaintiffs herein.

2.

With respect to the plaintiffs' claim for attorney fees under the "third-party litigation
rule," the court finds that the rule recognizes that attorney fees may be a measure of
damages, but the rule is not a substantive basis for awarding attorneys fees to be
found within the court's inherent equitable authority.

3.

Further, the court finds that there was no "common fund" created by plaintiffs'
action in this case from which attorney fees can or should be paid.

4.

Further, with respect to the plaintiffs' claim for attorney fees under the "third-party
litigation rule," the court finds that there was no claim for recovery of damages or
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fees asserted by plaintiffs in their complaint herein as amended to date.
5.

With respect to the plaintiffs' claim for attorney fees under the "private attorney
general doctrine," in order to grant an award of attorney fees and costs under that
doctrine, the court must first determine whether the plaintiffs' legal action, and the
specific relief secured as a result of the plaintiffs' action, primarily benefitted the
plaintiffs individually or, rather, primarily benefitted the public at large.

6.

Further, with respect to the plaintiffs' claim for attorney fees under the "private
attorney general doctrine," that doctrine is not intended to extend the exception to the
American rule - which rule restricts awards of attorney fees in civil ligation to cases
where such an award is expressly authorized by contract or statute - to any case in
which a citizen's legal action effectively restrains an unreasonable exercise of
governmental power, even though such a legal action may incidentally result in a
general, indirect benefit to the public at large.

7.

Further, with respect to the plaintiffs' claim for attorney fees under the "private
attorney general doctrine," the plaintiffs in the underlying litigation sought and
obtained relief for their "special private injury," not for vindication of a broad public
interest.

8.

Further, with respect to the plaintiffs' claim for attorney fees under the "private
attorney general doctrine," in analyzing whether the individual plaintiffs, as opposed
to the general public, primarily benefitted from the prosecution of this action by the
plaintiffs, the Court finds here that plaintiffs as individuals primarily benefitted from
the relief they secured, and not the general public. Specifically, the court concludes
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that approximately ninety percent (90%) of the benefit of the relief obtained inured
to the plaintiffs as individuals, while approximately ten percent (10%) of the benefit
may have inured to the general public. Thus, plaintiffs have failed to meet their
burden under the private attorney general doctrine of showing that the public at large
primarily benefitted from the plaintiffs' prosecution of this action.
9.

Defendant Salt Lake County's Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiffs' Statement of
Facts is denied.

THEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing, the Court ORDERS as follows:
1.

Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorneys Fees, Costs and Litigation Expenses is
DENIED.

2.

Defendant Salt Lake County's Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiffs'
Statement of Facts is DENIED.

DATED this

C ^

day of

/ ^ ^ ^ ^

2006.

BY THE COURT:
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that the foregoing ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS5 MOTION FOR
AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS and DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE
was duly served upon the following by U.S. First Class Mail, postage prepaid:
Ronald G. Russell, Esq.
Jeffrey J. Hunt, Esq.
David C. Reymann, Esq.
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS

185 South State Street, Suite 1300
Salt Lake City UT 84111
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Mark O. Moms, Esq.
David P. Williams, Esq.
SNELL & WILMER

15 West South Temple Street, Suite 1200
Salt Lake City UT 84101
Attorneys for Third-Party Defendants

on this l ^ d a y o f
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